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BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgement/Decree of Divorce entered 
by the Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, Utah, on October 
21st, 1998. A Notice of Appeal was filed on November 17,1998. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a- 3(h) U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellee does not disagree with Appellant's Statement of the Issues 
Presented. 
Appellee would like an award of costs and attorney's fees. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Section 30-3-5(1) provides in relevant part, that: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the...property, debts or obligations and 
parties. 
Rule 40, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such 
terms as are just, including the payment of cost occasioned by such 
postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause shown. 
If the motion is made upon the ground of absence of evidence, such 
motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he 
expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon admits that such 
evidence would be given, and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial shall 
not be postponed on that ground. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Statement of the case as set forth in 
her brief with the addition in the "Course of Proceedings" section that 
Appellee submitted Discovery to Appellant on April 2,1998 [R.9], filed a 
Motion to Compel on May 8, 1998, [R.10], and received responses on May 
13,1998. [R.11]. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee will continue Appellant's use of the parties first names. 
Brenda is Appellant. Ivan is Appellee. 
This case concerns the property award after a divorce trial between 
two people who were married for a short period of time. They were married 
on July 29,1995 [R.1]. Appellee filed for divorce on February 26,1998. 
[R.1]. The marriage was a happy one for about a year. [TR-14], but it 
deteriorated so that Appellant moved from the marital residence in October 
or November 1997 [TR-26; 66]. (The first page of the trial transcript in the 
court file is numbered "73." The following pages are not numbered 
separately by the court. All references to the transcript are indicated "TR" 
and refer to the court reporters page number.) 
Although there is no testimony about the ages of the parties, that they 
were advanced in years is supported in the record of Ivan's references to his 
Social Security payments [TR-19] and the fact that this was Ivan's third 
marriage and Brenda's fourth. [TR-16; 65]. 
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Both parties owned a residence that had been acquired beforehand 
from non-martial assets. Ivan had 1.25 acres with a trailer that his mother 
gave to him and a brother and a sister. Ivan purchased their interest prior to 
the marriage [TR-21-2]. Brenda owned a trailer [TR-28; 67]. She had lived 
in it for at least eight years before marrying Ivan. It was habitable [TR-67]. 
The parties moved into Ivan's trailer after their marriage [TR-20; 68]. 
During the marriage the parties kept their finances separate [TR-30]. 
They maintained separate bank accounts and credit cards [TR-30-1; 53; 71-
6]. They each kept their separate vehicle [TR-32]. 
Each had their own source of income. Brenda worked at Allen 
Memorial Hospital [TR-20;57]. Although Brenda characterizes Ivan as self-
employed in her brief, he worked only part-time. He was restricted in the 
amount of money he could earn by Social Security [TR-19]. His major 
source of income was payments for the property he had acquired and sold 
before the marriage [TR-19]. 
After moving into Ivan's trailer, improvements were made to make it 
habitable. (It was a 1956 ten-wide trailer with a room on the side [TR-20]). 
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marriage [TR-72-3], and that she would not make any payments on the 
$25,000.00 loan for home improvements [TR-76]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant 
Brenda another continuance. The point is moot since Appellant only 
requested an extension to allow time to obtain an appraisal and the Court 
allowed the introduction of Appellant's value of the trailer. Appellee should 
not be penalized for Appellant's failure to exercise due diligence in 
preparing for trial. 
The division of the personal and real property was fair and equitable. 
ARGUMENT I 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. 
Appellee takes virtually no exception to the general principles of 
caselaw cited by Appellant in this argument or the issue of property 
divisions. His position is that the even conceding the equitable bases for 
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Ivan took out a loan for $25,000 for the improvements [TR-9]. He 
introduced Exhibits 1 and 2 showing the home improvement expenses. 
Brenda never made loan payments [TR-23; 74]. She is not willing to make 
any future payments or assume any obligation for the loan payments [TR-
75-6]. Ivan has made 38 payments of $338.41 on the loan and has 82 more 
payments of the same amount that he was ordered to pay [TR-23]. Ivan 
made all of the payments for taxes and insurance on his property [TR-22]. 
He paid the utilities [TR-53]. 
The parties intended to fix Brenda's trailer up and rent it [TR-63]. 
Instead, Brenda allowed her son to live there rent-free during the marriage 
[TR-69]. She paid the property tax on the trailer [TR-69]. She made some 
space rent payments of $150.00 each for the trailer [TR-69-70]. During the 
marriage Brenda had replaced or repaired a water heater, stove, air 
conditioner, carpeting and countertops in the trailer [TR-83-4]. Total 
improvements were at least $3500.00 [TR-85]. 
Brenda's position is that Ivan had no equity or interest in her mobile 
home [TR-71-2], no interest in her retirement benefits accrued during the 
5 
The argument that Brenda was surprised by failure to reach an 
agreement on her share of the equity is contrary to her arguments to the trial 
court. Brenda concedes that "it's clear from the Complaint that respondent 
has no interest whatsoever in the residence they shared." [TR-7]. See also 
paragraph 7 of the Complaint. [R.2] Brenda has produced no evidence that a 
settlement was close. To the contrary, Ivan invited contact trying to settle the 
case by letters dated August 21 and September 11th (See Addendum). There 
was no response. 
The cases Brenda cites support Ivan's position. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 
P.2d 1018, (Utah App 1992). Held there was no abuse of discretion in failing 
to grant a continuance when movant had failed to obtain a witness in a 
timely matter, exactly Brenda's situation. 
The instant case is distinguished from Christensen v. Christensen, 619 
P.2d 1372 (Utah 1980). In that case Appellee had wrongfully withheld 
promised evidence from Appellant. There is no indication here that Appellee 
withheld anything from Appellant through nonfeasance, misfeasance or 
malfeasance. Indeed, the record supports a total lack of Brenda to pursue 
information or evidence through either of her attorneys. 
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relief cited by Appellant there is no abuse by the trial court. Further, in 
considering harm to Appellant by denial of the continuance, it is apparent 
she suffered none. She wanted a continuance to introduce testimony about 
the appraised value of Ivan's trailer [TR-4]. She introduced such testimony. 
Brenda takes the position that the trial court abused its discretion on the bald 
assertions that the matter was continued based on a stipulation of the parties 
and that she was unfairly surprised when an anticipated settlement was not 
reached. 
The record does not support a stipulated first continuance. Appellant 
filed a Motion on July 17,1998. Although the record does not support it, the 
clear inference is that Brenda obtained a continuance to obtain new counsel. 
This point is conceded by Brenda on page 9 of her brief. See also #3 under 
Course of Proceedings, page 3, Appellant's Brief. 
* The balance of Brenda's argument is that she exercised due diligence, 
that she believed the matter would be settled, and that she was surprised at 
having to go to trial. The matter to be settled was Brenda's share of equity in 
Ivan's house. 
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POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT'S DIVISION OF THE REAL AND 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE. 
Again, Appellee does not quibble with Appellant's caselaw on 
equitable division of marital property or her characterizations of a marriage 
as a partnership. However, the trial court's division was fair. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 
(Utah 1987) at 135 the fact that premarital property is viewed as separate 
property. It sets out several criteria to use in determining if the other spouse 
should receive an interest in such property including joint enhancement of 
the property. The Court indicated consideration of whether the property was 
acquired before the marriage, age, the standard of living, duration of 
marriage, and what the parties gave up are relevant. The Burke Court did not 
award an interest. 
Applying the Burke criteria and equitable standards to the real estate, 
the trial court's division of the real property was fair. It was Ivan's separate 
property before the marriage. Brenda did not give up her trailer to live with 
Ivan and in fact, allowed her son to live in it rent-free, waiving a benefit to 
the marriage. Brenda did not assume any of the financial burden of Ivan's 
house and was not willing to do so. She valued her share of the equity at 
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$4000.00 in her interrogatories [TR- 77] and had put $3500.00 of 
improvements into her own trailer. Brenda did not seem to be interested in 
giving equity to Ivan in an increase in value to her trailer. She objected to 
testimony concerning projects Ivan had done for her [TR-30]. The parties 
kept all their finances separate. Brenda did not feel Ivan had an interest in 
her retirement accrued during the marriage. 
It is impossible to say what the value of the increase of equity is in 
Ivan's home during the marriage. Brenda's contention is that the original 
value of $15,000 is not accurate. The value of something is its fair market 
value, not what you pay your family for it. Brenda did not introduce, and 
never sought to introduce, any evidence of the value of Ivan's property at the 
time of the marriage. 
It need also be noted that since the parties kept their finances separate 
and that Ivan made all of the loan payments, any increase in the equity of his 
trailer was pad for from his separate pre-marital estate. The majority of his 
income came from the pre-marital sale of real estate [TR-19; 127]. 
The evidence of a market analysis by a part-time real estate agent 
provides no indication of the increase of value during the marriage. Any 
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such evidence needs to be considered unreliable. The agent never entered 
the home or made an effort to. Her analysis is flawed since she did not enter 
the home, a point she conceded [TR-107]. She is not aware of the interior 
deficiencies Ivan testified about [TR-52-3]. The Court returned $2500.00 of 
landscaping improvements to Brenda when she indicated she wanted them 
[TR-110;126;128-9]. 
Likewise, Brenda has not shown this Court that the division of the 
personal property was capricious. She did not testify nor has she argued over 
monetary values. The record indicates that Ivan was not present when 
Brenda moved out of the home. She had free rein in removing whatever she 
wanted and did so. Items were removed from the house by her family 
without her knowledge [TR-78-80]. The Court's award merely returned to 
Ivan his share of the property and items he had made for the home [TR-37-
40]. 
Brenda's attitude toward the equity seems to be the classic "what's his 
is mine and what's mine is mine." She had no desire to allow Ivan an 
interest in anything of hers. She had not given Ivan any benefit from renting 
her residence while she lived in his trailer. She is not willing to make any 
11 
payments on the loan she argues was used to increase the trailer's equity. If 
this Court finds Brenda is entitled to an interest in Ivan's trailer, it should 
order her to assume half of the payments. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unfair to Appellee to penalize Ivan for Appellant's failure to 
exercise due diligence in preparing for trial. Once negotiations have failed 
and a trial date is scheduled, a party is remiss in not making adequate 
preparations. There is no evidence that Appellant's supposed expectations of 
a settlement was realistic. 
The division of the real and personal property was equitable. 
Appellant has not shown any abuse of discretion that would allow a reversal 
of the trial court. 
DATED this Z&A of August, 1999. 
William L. Schtjhz [ 
Attorney for Appetfee^\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to Rosalie Reilly, 148 South Main, #1, P.O. 
Box 404, Monticello, Utah 84532, postage prepaid, this ZjUt of August, 
1999. 
LJJJU. J, 
WILLI 
Attorney 
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August 21, 1998 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 404 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Dear Rose: 
RE: Winder v. Winder 
Please advise regarding the status of discussions with your client regarding a 
settlement in the above-entitled divorce action. The matter is set for hearing on October 6. 
Thank you. 
Cordially, 
William L. Schultz 
WLS/ak 
Ince;0702981tr.wp 
Please direct all correspondence to the above Moab office. Thank you. 
WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ 
A T T O R N E Y AT LAW 
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4 3 5 - ? 5 9 - 5 9 l 4 
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317 S O U T H M A I N , #3 
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September 11, 1998 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 404 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Dear Rose: 
RE: Winder v. Winder 
I have not received a response from you to my letter of August 21 regarding 
attempting to settle the above matter before the divorce hearing on October 6. Please 
let me know your standing in this matter. Thank you. 
Cordially, 
William L. Schultz 
WLS/ak 
Please direct all correspondence to the above Moab office. Thank you. 
